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
Authentication in dynamic groups using Identity-based Signatures

October 16, 2018 IEEE WiMob 2018 Limassol, Cyprus



group communication








verify message authenticity








verify message authenticity








classic authentication








Dynamic groups








Classic approach too expensive





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Abstract—Group communication in constrained networks lately sparked broader interest as it allows dealing more efficiently with the few available resources. Both sender authentication and membership verification are serious issues to be tackled despite the lack of resources. Identity-based signatures (IBS) offer an alternative to certificate-based authentication by mathematically binding a user's public key to its identity. To utilize the consequently smaller network load, this paper proposes an IBS-based lightweight solution to achieve authentication and membership verification for group communication in constrained environments. An infrastructure for managing IBSbased authentication is introduced together with a taxonomy for the selection of suitable IBS schemes. An implementation and practical evaluation on basis of an IoT-lab completes this, demonstrating that IBS is a viable option for very constrained devices. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first fully operational implementation and proof of applicability of IBS in such a scenario.

Keywords-IoT; Multicast; Security; Group Communication; Authentication; Identity-Based Signatures this case meaning frequently changing group settings, for which IBS is second to none in terms of messages to be exchanged. Even though X.509 certificate compression has already been addressed by the IETF [2], access management is typically enforced using costly revocation lists. Frameworks such as SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) or OAuth (Open Authorization) offer optimizations based on socalled access tokens. They can also be used to grant both group access and group authentication. However, individual sender authentication is not covered.

Talking about IBS and its use for authenticated group communication, it is inevitable to define the term authenticity in the scope of group communication. A well-suited definition is given in an earlier publication [3]: "A message is authentic, if the message originates from its stated sender. Similar to message integrity, in group communication scenarios one can differentiate two types of message authenticity: a) a message can be proven to originate from within the communication










Idea: (Shamir, 1984)


Compute public key from identifying information
















Related work
















Are Identity-Based Signatures viable in constrained networks?

- Parameter sizes
- Power consumption
- Key management








Tested in IoT-Lab (iot-lab.info):

• 3x M3 Nodes (= group members)

(72 Mhz ARM Cortex M3, 64KB RAM)

- in a multicast domain
- 1x A8 Node *(= TTP)*

(600 Mhz ARM Cortex A8, 256MB RAM)







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
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Tested for 2 IBS-schemes

- "VBNN" (Cao et al., 2008, based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC))
- "BLMQ" (Barreto et al., 2006, based on ECC with pairings)







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
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
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- "BLMQ" (Barreto et al., 2006, based on ECC with pairings)

Implementation

- Operating System: RIOT (https://riot-os.org)
- Cryptographic library: Relic (https://github.com/relic-toolkit/relic)








Time consumption for signing one message





Time consumption for verifying one message





Key management for the group

- Identification
- Authorization
- Key distribution




IBS in existing key management architectures




Key management for the group

- Identification
- Authorization
- Key distribution

→ Use group key infrastructure as in RFC 4046







Source: gentschen Felde, N., Guggemos, T., Heider, T., Kranzlmüller, D., <u>Secure Group Key Distribution in</u> <u>Constrained Environments with IKEv2</u>, Proceedings of 2017th IEEE Conference on Dependable and Secure Computing, IEEE, Taipei, Taiwan, August, 2017.





- extended evaluation with additional devices
- experimental comparison to certificate-based approaches
- evaluate Hierarchical IBS
- more efficient re-keying in IBS





- discussion of IBS in groups
 - mathematically sound key revocation
 - integration in key management architectures
- taxonomy for scheme comparison
- testing and measurements of using IBS on constrained devices

